Using Context-Based Password Strength Meter to Nudge Users' Password Generating Behavior: A Randomized Experiment by Khern-am-nuai, Warut et al.
Using Context-Based Password Strength Meter to Nudge Users’ Password
Generating Behavior: A Randomized Experiment
Warut Khern-am-nuai
McGill University
warut.khern-am-nuai@mcgill.ca
Weining Yang
Purdue University
yang469@purdue.edu
Ninghui Li
Purdue University
ninghui@cs.purdue.edu
Abstract
Encouraging users to create stronger passwords is
one of the key issues in password-based authentication.
It is particularly important as prior works have high-
lighted that most passwords are weak. Yet, passwords
are still the most commonly used authentication method.
This paper seeks to mitigate the issue of weak pass-
words by proposing a context-based password strength
meter. We conduct a randomized experiment on Ama-
zon MTurk and observe the change in users’ behavior.
The results show that our proposed method is signifi-
cantly effective. Users exposed to our password strength
meter are more likely to change their passwords after
seeing the warning message, and those new passwords
are stronger. Furthermore, users are willing to invest
their time to learn about creating a stronger password,
even in a traditional password strength meter setting.
Our findings suggest that simply incorporating contex-
tual information to password strength meters could be
an effective method in promoting more secure behaviors
among end users.
1. Introduction
Passwords have been an essential user authentication
method for years despite the availability of stronger au-
thentication mechanisms [1]. However, there is one ma-
jor dilemma associated with password-based authenti-
cation. That is, a password must be easy for the owner
to remember but it must be hard for others to guess.
Naturally, many users prefer memorability over security,
choosing weak passwords. According to a survey con-
ducted by TeleSign in 2015 [2], 3 out of 4 users chose
weak passwords, and 40 percent of them experienced an
issue with their account security in the past year.
One popular approach to mitigate the issue of weak
passwords is to create a visual feedback in the password
generation process through a “password strength meter”.
The meter calculates password strength using an algo-
rithm, and displays the strength information to the user.
Previous works in this area have focused on improving
the underlying algorithm by seeking to find the better
(faster or more accurate) ways to calculate password
strength [3, 4]. Yet, little research has been conducted
to understand how users perceive password strength me-
ters and the implication of the meters’ component, par-
ticularly the warning message, despite the fact that most
users do not understand the implication of warning mes-
sages due to their limited technical background (e.g.,
what does “weak” password really mean?). This lack of
understanding could significantly impact the effective-
ness of password strength meters.
In this study, we draw from theories in psychol-
ogy, human-computer interaction, and warning sciences
to develop a theoretical foundation of how password
strength meter works. We consider password strength
meters to be an interactive warning and adopt the
Communication-Human Information Processing Model
(C-HIP) [5] as a framework to explain why traditional
password strength meters are ineffective. We hypothe-
size that incorporating contextual information into warn-
ing messages could draw users’ attention, positively af-
fect their understandings and beliefs, and act as a stimu-
lus to nudge their password generating behavior. Hence,
the context-based password strength meter would be
more effective in nudging users to think more about their
passwords, and promoting their secure behaviors.
We test our hypotheses by analyzing data from a hu-
man subject study conducted on Amazon Mechanical
Turk. We introduce hypothetical situations where par-
ticipants are required to create an online account in dif-
ferent scenarios. We examine the effects of three ex-
perimental treatments (different context-based warning
messages) on the effectiveness of the password strength
meter. More specifically, we evaluate the password
strength, how often a user changes her password im-
mediately after seeing the warning message, and how
often a user wants to learn more about how to create
stronger passwords. We find that the context-based pass-
word meter enhances password security. It nudges users
to change the password more often, and the new pass-
words they pick are stronger. We also find that incorpo-
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rating a link that points to learning more about how to
create a stronger password is effective even for the tra-
ditional password strength meter. Our findings suggest
that incorporating contextual information into password
strength meters’ warning message could be one effec-
tive method to promote more secure behaviors among
end users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we discuss related work and develop our hy-
potheses. We then describe the design of our study and
the methodology of our human subject study in Section
3. In Section 4, we present our analysis. Finally, we
discuss our results and conclude our study in Section 5.
2. Conceptual Background
In this section, we first describe previous works re-
lated to password security, password strength meters,
users’ perception of warning messages and warning
models, and contextual information. Following that, we
develop our main hypotheses.
One line of research on password security studies
the property of the passwords. In general, it is found
that end users tend to choose passwords that are easy
to remember but also easy to guess. It has been sug-
gested that organizations should use tools, such as pass-
word validation software, to mitigate this issue [1, 7]. It
has been argued that users could be motivated to adopt
secure behavior through well-planned security mecha-
nisms or punishment threats [6]. Another line of re-
search investigated users’ password creation behavior
when facing different stimuli such as password policy
designs [8], and training techniques [9]. This paper fol-
lows this line by investigating password meter designs
that could affect users’ password generating behavior.
2.1 Password Strength Meters
The concept of password strength meters has been
discussed in the literature for decades [11]. It has been
shown to be effective in leading users to create stronger
passwords [12, 13]. However, the design and imple-
mentation of these meters are usually ad-hoc, and op-
erate like a black-box (i.e., without explanations or jus-
tifications of design choices) [14]. Hence, the password
strength meters on most websites are found to be incon-
sistent [15], which are confusing and may weaken the
purpose of the password strength meter itself.
Most research works that aim to enhance the effec-
tiveness of password strength meters have focused on
the algorithm. It has been recognized that password
strength meters are less accurate than entropy measure-
ment of an ideal case [16, 17]. And many techniques
have been proposed to overcome this limitation, in-
cluding the use of probabilistic context-free grammars
[3, 18], and Markov model [19, 4]. However, despite
the advancement in developing algorithms, relative little
research has been done to investigate how password me-
ters interact with human users. We consider password
strength meters as a form of warning and adopt models
and theories from the warning science literature, which
is reviewed next.
2.2 Warning Models
The warning science literature has identified two crit-
ical factors of warning, “hazard matching”, and “arousal
strength” [20]. The first term refers to the ability of a
warning message to convey potential risks to users. If
the message cannot convince a user regarding the level
of risks involved, she may choose to ignore it. Mean-
while, the latter term refers to how users perceive the
urgency of the warning [21]. If the warning message is
perceived to be nonessential, then the user may choose
to ignore it as well.
In this paper, we adopt the Communication-Human
Information Processing (C-HIP) Model, which has been
adopted for identifying potential reasons of warning in-
effectiveness by several prior works [20, 22, 23]. The
full model description is shown in Figure 1.
The C-HIP model consists of nine phases. It begins
when a source delivers a warning message to a receiver
through a channel and ends with a change of receiver’s
behavior. At the time a receiver receives the warning
message, she would also receive other environmental
stimuli, which might distract her from paying attention
to the warning. The essential phases of this model for
our study are within the information processing phases,
which start after the receiver receives the warning mes-
sage. As these phases are recognized and processed by
each receiver, they essentially determine the effective-
ness of the warning (i.e., whether the warning results in a
change of a receiver’s behavior or not). In this paper, we
adopt a practice used by literature in human-computer
interaction, which suggests to use a set of questions to
evaluate the effectiveness of the warning in each phase
[20, 24].
First, we start at the Attention Switch phase and the
Attention Maintenance phase, which correspond to the
question “Do users notice the indicators?” Although
indicators of password strength meters are found to be
inconsistent across websites, they are generally well-
designed to sufficiently catch users’ attention [14]. In
addition, previous works have shown that they are gener-
ally recognized among end users [25]. Therefore, atten-
tion switch is unlikely to be a significant factor that con-
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Figure 1: Diagram of the C-HIP model
tributes to the ineffectiveness of password strength me-
ters. The next phase is Comprehension/Memory, which
corresponds to the question “Do users know what the in-
dicators mean?” To the best of our knowledge, there is
no previous research that looks into this specific ques-
tion in the context of password strength meters. How-
ever, empirical evidences have shown that end users
are unaware of information security issues in general
[26, 27]. Furthermore, end-users often do not recognize
the issue of weak passwords [1]. In addition, a previ-
ous study in warning science has concluded that novice
users usually make mistake in terms of warning recog-
nition, such as considering the wrong variables, missing
some variables, or considering the right variables but in
the wrong order [28]. Therefore, it can be inferred that
not understanding the warning messages could be one of
the factors that lead to password strength meters’ inef-
fectiveness. This lack of understanding could also lead
to the ineffectiveness of other phases down the line. For
instance, with a lack of understanding, users might not
believe the warning in the Attention/Beliefs phase and
thus have no motivation to change their behavior in the
Motivation phase.
2.3 Contextual Information
The practice of using contextual information to rem-
edy lack of understanding is common in the literature
[29, 30, 31]. Vance et al. find that incorporating “fear ap-
peals”, which could be considered as one type of contex-
tual information, can increase final password strengths
[32]. However, that paper only investigates the changes
in final password strength, which could be a mislead-
ing dependent variable as described later. Our work is
significantly different from theirs as we seek to examine
the changes in password meters’ effectiveness with three
different measurements along with other contextual in-
formation.
In the context of warning design, the use of contex-
tual information is outline by Wogalter et al. [33]. In
addition, Bauer et al. [28, 34] proposes that relevant
contextual information should be presented in warning
design as they observe that users tend to ignore warn-
ing messages as they do not understand them. Base on
these guidelines, we predict that adding contextual in-
formation to password strength meters would enhance
users’ understanding in the warning messages, result-
ing in more effective Comprehension/Memory phase in
the C-HIP model, and leading to improved security in
users’ behaviors. Desired behaviors of users who are
exposed to password strength meters include changing
their passwords and selecting stronger passwords. We
also anticipate that users who are exposed to contextual
information would want to seek additional information
regarding password security, if available. Therefore, we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1a Participants in the context-based warn-
ing message treatment choose a stronger password than
their original password after seeing the warning.
Hypothesis 1b New passwords chosen by participants
in the context-based warning message treatment are
stronger than those chosen by participants in the con-
trol group.
Hypothesis 2a Participants in the context-based warn-
ing message treatment change their passwords after see-
ing the warning.
Hypothesis 2b Participants in the context-based warn-
ing message treatment are more likely to change their
passwords compared to those in the control group.
Hypothesis 3a Participants in the context-based warn-
ing message treatment try to seek additional information
regarding how to create a stronger password after see-
ing the warning.
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Hypothesis 3b Participants in the context-based warn-
ing message treatment are more likely to seek additional
information compared to those in the control group.
3. Methodology
To test our hypotheses, we conduct a human sub-
ject study on Amazon Mechanical Turk involving hypo-
thetical situations where users need to create an online
account. Participants are informed of the experimen-
tal study and asked for their consent to participate. By
agreeing, participants allow researchers to collect and
analyze their passwords in unencrypted, but anonymized
manner.
3.1 Dependent Variable
There are three dependent variables that our study
seeks to investigate. First, the increase in strength of
passwords generated. Second, the number of occa-
sions participants change their passwords after seeing
the password strength meter. Third, the number of occa-
sions participants invest their time to learn how to create
strong passwords.
The increase in password strength is a common de-
pendent variable in password studies. It represents the
ultimate goal of password strength meters, which is to
encourage a user to change his or her password and
pick a password that is stronger than the original one.
In our study, the strength of passwords is measured us-
ing the Backoff Markov Model with end symbol nor-
malization proposed in [4]. The model is trained with
the RockYou dataset, which contains over 32 million
passwords leaked from the social application site Rock-
you in December 2009. In the model, we only main-
tain substrings with frequency no less than 1,000 and
drop the ones appear less than 1,000 times (meaning
the frequency threshold is set to be 1,000). We then as-
sign a strength label for each password as the following.
We label a password as Weak if when it is the among
the 300,000 most frequent passwords according to the
model. This means that if an attacker tries passwords
following a descending order of the probability gener-
ated by the model, the account will be compromised in
300,000 attempts. We label a password as Medium if it
is among the top 5,000,000 passwords but not in the top
300,000. If the probability of a password is not in the
top 5,000,000, we label the password as Strong.
Second, we are interested in how password strength
meters affect the number of occasions where users
change their password after seeing the warning mes-
sage. This variable is usually overlooked in password
strength meter studies. However, without fully under-
standing the effect of password meters on this variable,
the interpretation of the final password strength, which
is commonly used as a dependent variable in many pass-
word strength meter studies, could be missing important
information. For instance, suppose there are two users.
Users A initially picked a strong password and never
changes it. Meanwhile, users B initially picked a weak
password but changes to a strong one after seeing a pass-
word strength assessment. If the strength of the final
password is the only measurement (as commonly used
in previous password strength meter studies), we would
not be able to distinguish these two users and hence treat
them as the same group of users (e.g., users with a strong
password) in the analysis. Our study provides additional
insights in that regard.
Third, as we present contextual information to partic-
ipants, we anticipate that they might be involved as they
understand more about the passwords they use. As a re-
sult, they might be willing to invest their time to learn
more about how to create a strong password, which will
help them improve security in the future. Therefore,
together with the strength of the password, we present
a link at the bottom of the password meter labeling as
“Tips towards strong passwords”. We are interested in
the number of occasions participants click this link as
it presents an opportunity to educate users regarding
how to create stronger passwords and promote security
awareness among them. To the best of our knowledge,
Our study is the first that investigates the effectiveness
of a password strength meters as a tool to educate users
and promote security awareness.
3.2 Experimental Design
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant
is randomly presented with one of the following scenar-
ios: Bank, Restaurant, and Forum. Following that, the
participant is asked to create an online account corre-
sponding to her scenario. Bank is a scenario where users
have to store both financial information and personal in-
formation in the account. Meanwhile, she needs to store
only a part of her personal information (e.g., name and
delivery address) in Restaurant and only her email in
Forum.
Next, the participant is asked to create a password for
her account. The interface of the password input form is
in Figure 2. Once the participant finishes typing a pass-
word, we calculate the strength of the password. The
password strength meter then displays a warning mes-
sage to the right of the password input form. The system
randomly assigns one of four experimental treatments:
Control, Time, Rank, or Probability. They correspond to
the type of warning messages displayed with the pass-
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word strength meter. Note that we impose a password
length requirement of at least six characters for all treat-
ments. No other requirements (e.g., policies such as us-
ing both letters and digits) are imposed.
In thecontrol treatment, users receive a warning mes-
sage that contains only the labels derived from calcu-
lated strength of the passwords they pick (e.g., Weak,
Medium, or Strong). It is a standard practice in many
major websites [15].
Figure 2: The Interface of Password Generation
In the time treatment, users receive a warning mes-
sage that contains the strength of the password they pick,
along with the time that a hypothetical hacker could use
to crack that password. We calculate the estimated time
to crack by assessing the time needed if an attacker con-
tinuously attacking the account by trying the most pop-
ular passwords first. We assume the attacker can try 100
passwords per second, which is a conservative assump-
tion considering that it could be much faster in a real-
world scenario [35]. An example of this warning mes-
sage is: “Weak. We estimate that it takes 10 seconds to
crack your password, assuming that the attacker can try
100 passwords every second.”.
In the rank treatment, users receive a warning mes-
sage that contains the strength and the rank of the
password. We calculate the rank as the following.
First, we generate a list of passwords using the Backoff
Markov Model trained on an existing password dataset.
The passwords are generated in descending order of
the probability. Therefore, in the generation process,
weaker passwords (i.e., those with higher probability)
are output earlier. The rank of passwords chosen by par-
ticipants are estimated based on the list of passwords
generated. Specifically, we pick passwords of the ranks
that have only one significant digit (e.g., 10, 20, ...,
100, 200, ...) from this list and calculate their corre-
sponding probability, resulting in rank-probability pair
for each one. Then, once a participant enters a pass-
word, we calculate the probability of the password us-
ing the same password model, and match the probability
with the closest rank-probability pair generated earlier.
Thus, The rank of the password is estimated as the high-
est rank whose corresponding probability is smaller than
the probability of the chosen password. In this way, we
essentially round up the actual rank of the password and
display one significant digit. For example, if the rank
of a password is 24,321, we show: “Weak. We estimate
that the password you chose is among the 30,000 weak-
est passwords”.
In the probability treatment, users receive a warn-
ing message that contains the strength of the password
along with an estimated number of accounts that use the
same password if there are 10 billion accounts globally.
The estimated value is calculated by the probability of
the password generated by the Backoff Markov Model
multiplies by 10 billion. For example, if the probability
calculate by the model is 0.001, we show: “Weak. We
estimate that about 10,000,000 other accounts will have
the same password as you within 10 billion accounts”.
In all treatments, we first calculate the probability
of passwords utilizing the Backoff Markov Model when
the webpage is loaded. Then, the strength of the pass-
words and the context-based warning message are gen-
erated and shown when the active cursor in the input
box becomes inactive. Specifically, we listen to the
event “focusout” of the password input field. Once an
event is triggered, the script estimating and displaying
the strength of passwords is executed. Note that the
model is implemented in Javascript and all necessary
data are transmitted to users’ browser by AJAX calls.
Hence, there is no communication between the browser
and our server until the passwords are finally submitted.
Lastly, below the warning message, we include a
clickable link with a caption “Tips towards strong pass-
word”. The password generation tips are displayed to
the user when the link is clicked. (We obtain password
generation tips from http://windows.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows-vista/tips-for-creating-a-strong-password.)
Note that we record the entire history of passwords
generated on the webpage. All user interactions,
including the timestamp of each event that shows when
the event occurs, are recorded as well.
Once the users finish creating their passwords for
their hypothetical account, we conduct a post-test survey
to address one of the major concerns in password gener-
ation studies. That is, the password that users generated
in the experiment might not be usable [36]. For exam-
ple, participants might generate a random password that
they do not intend to remember. To alleviate such as
issue, we ask participants to complete a survey regard-
ing their password generation strategy after they submit
their passwords. The survey is about how users generate
their passwords in general (not only the password they
just created for this study). It takes about 30-60 minutes
to complete the survey. After users finish answering the
survey, we ask them to re-enter the password they cre-
ated for their account. Participants who fail to recall
the previously generated password after three attempts
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are excluded from our analysis. Following that, we ask
users to answer demographic questions including age,
gender, and education level, for the purpose of statisti-
cal controls.
3.3 Data Collection
We first conducted a pilot test involving 10 partici-
pants. The primary purpose of the pilot test is to ensure
that our system works as intended. We also collected
and analyzed the data to evaluate our experimental de-
sign. Some texts displayed were updated as necessary.
We also started recording the entry history of passwords
in the password generation process.
Our primary sample consists of 500 participants.
None of them fails the post-test password recall check.
Participants are compensated $0.75 after they complete
the experiment. We limit the age of participants to be
no less than 18.74 of the 500 participants are from 18 to
22; 202 of them are from 23 to 30; 133 of them are from
31 to 40; 64 of them are from 41 to 50; 25 of them are
older than 51 and the remaining 2 refuse to disclose their
age. For the 497 participants who disclose their gender,
283 of them are male and 214 are female. Regarding the
education level, the majority of them either have some
college credit (no degree) or bachelor’s degree. These
two categories account for 192 and 205 participants, re-
spectively. For the rest of the participants, 41 have high
school diploma, 47 have a master’s degree, 8 have a pro-
fessional degree, 6 have a doctoral degree, and 3 refuse
to reveal their education level.
4. Analysis
In this section, we present the results of our exper-
iment. We first use the regression analysis to examine
the effect of our control variables, which are age, gender,
and education level, on the dependent variables. We find
that none of them are significantly correlated with our
DVs, which are the increase in password strength, the
number of occasions users change their password, and
the number of occasions users click “Tips towards strong
password”. That is, these control variables explain the
variance of our dependent variables only marginally and
none of them is statistical significant at p < 0.10.
Next, we present our main results. Note that among
500 participants, 116 are assigned to the control group,
133 are in time treatment, 131 are in rank, and 120 are
in probability. As per the scenario assignment, 180 are
in bank, 166 are in restaurant, and 150 are in forum.
The details of the treatment/scenario assignment are pre-
sented in Table 1.
Table 1: Total number of participants in each
treatment/scenario
Time Rank Probability Control Total
Bank 41 55 47 41 184
Restaurant 51 36 43 36 166
Forum 41 40 30 39 150
Total 133 131 120 116 500
4.1 Password Strength
We begin with an analysis of the password strength.
We leverage the Probability Threshold Graph proposed
in [4]. Each line on the graph represents the guessibil-
ity of a password dataset calculated based a password
model (the Backoff Markov Model in our study.) A
point (x,y) on a line means that y percent of passwords
in the dataset have the probability of at least 2−x. For the
purpose of comparing the strength of password datasets,
we fix the x value, which is − log2 prob, where prob is
the probability assigned to a password by the password
model, and compare y values of different curves. A
higher y value indicates the password dataset is weaker
because it means that more passwords can be cracked
if passwords with less than the probability prob are at-
tempted.
The graph represents the strength of passwords gen-
erated by participants given different scenarios is illus-
trated in Figure 3. We display the curve of each scenario
as well as two curves generated from two existing leaked
password datasets. The PhpBB dataset includes about
250,000 passwords leaked from Phpbb.com in January
2009. The Yahoo dataset includes around 450,000 pass-
words published in July 2012. It is clear that passwords
generated in our study are much stronger than those in
the Yahoo and PhpBB datasets. We believe such a phe-
nomenon results from 1) users in general are more aware
of password security compared to users 3 years ago 2)
participants in MTurk are more involved in the digital
world and thus have more knowledge about cyber secu-
rity. Among 3 scenarios, the final strength of passwords
created for online banks dominates, indicating that peo-
ple tend to be more careful when facing financial or
monetary related situations. However, none of the dif-
ferences of final password strengths among 3 scenarios
and 4 treatments is statistically significant.
Next, we investigate the increase in password
strength rather than the final password strength. Note
that the distribution of the password strength is highly
skewed by nature. Therefore, we follow previous works
in the literature by applying the natural logarithms to
the password strength [32]. The average increase of
log password strength in different scenarios and types
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Figure 3: The strength of passwords generated by participants given different scenarios
of contextual information is shown in Table 2. Over-
all, context-based password meters outperform the tra-
ditional password meter in terms of password strength
increase. Interestingly, users under the Forum scenario
(where users do not have to store any personal infor-
mation) have the highest average increase in password
strength compare to other two scenarios where some
personal information and financial information are in-
volved. This behavior could be explained through the
initial password strength as the strength of initial pass-
words in Forum are far weaker than those in Restaurant
and Bank. In addition, we also observe that a few users
change their passwords to weaker ones after they see the
password strength meters.
Table 2: The average increase of password strength
score (calculated by the Backoff Markov Model)
under different scenarios and contextual warning
messages
Time Rank Probability Control Total
Bank 0.0277 0.0373 0.0269 -0.0439 0.0144
Restaurant 0.0353 0.1082 0.0501 0.0410 0.0562
Forum 0.0510 0.1664 0.0718 0.0243 0.0790
Total 0.0378 0.0962 0.0465 0.0054 0.0477
We then employ the t-test analysis to test if the
password strength increase in each treatment group is
higher than zero. We find that the increase in pass-
word strength under 3 types of contextual information
are all statistically significant (t = 2.7667, p = 0.0032;
t = 3.7886, p = 0.0001; and t = 3.0906, p = 0.0012
for Time, Rank, and Probability respectively). There-
fore, Hypothesis 1a is supported. Following that, we
use ANOVA to test whether the difference in password
strength increase between at least one treatment group
and control group is statistically significant. The re-
sults indicate that the difference is significant (F =
3.5234, p = 0.0075). However, our pairwise compari-
son (using Tukey HSD Test) reveals that even though
the average increase in password strength of all 3 types
of contextual information are higher than the control
one, only the difference of Rank is statistically signifi-
cant (t = 3.18, p= 0.004). Hence, Hypothesis 1b is par-
tially supported. It is also worth noting that the password
strength increase in Rank treatment significantly out-
weighs that of other experimental treatments, followed
by the Probability treatment while the Time treatment
performs the worst.
4.2 Password Reset
Our second variable of interest is the number of oc-
casions where users change their password after seeing a
warning message provided by password strength meters.
As we argue earlier, this variable is particularly impor-
tant to measure the effectiveness of password strength
meters but it is typically overlooked by prior studies.
Table 3 reports the numbers of times when users
change their passwords in different settings. Context-
based password strength meters also outperform the tra-
ditional password strength meter in terms of nudging
users to change passwords. The user behavior in the
Bank scenario here is also consistent with our obser-
vation in the previous section. They change passwords
much less often compared to users in the other two sce-
narios. We believe that this behavior is consistent with
the fact that their initial passwords are strong (e.g., they
might be confident about the strength of their initial
passwords).
For hypothesis testing, the average number of occa-
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Table 3: The average number of occasions where
users change their password under different
scenarios and contextual warning messages
Time Rank Probability Control Total
Bank 0.1220 0.2182 0.1277 0.1463 0.1576
Restaurant 0.1961 0.3333 0.2326 0.1111 0.2169
Forum 0.1220 0.3750 0.3667 0.0769 0.2267
Total 0.1504 0.2977 0.2250 0.1121 0.1980
sions where users change their password after observ-
ing three types of the contextual information we propose
are all statistically significant (t = 3.5790, p = 0.0002;
t = 4.4163, p < 0.0001; and t = 4.3096, p < 0.0001 for
Time, Rank, and Probability respectively). Therefore,
Hypothesis 2a is statistically supported. However, as in
the case with the increase in password strength, ANOVA
reports that the difference in the average between treat-
ment and control is significant (F = 2.4658, p= 0.0308)
but the post-hoc pairwise comparison shows that only
the difference between the Rank type and the control
group is statistically significant (t = 2.48, p = 0.032).
Hence, Hypothesis 2b is partially supported. In this
evaluation, the order of the effectiveness of our three
experimental treatments remains unchanged. Rank still
performs the best while the Time treatment remains the
worst. However, the difference between Rank and Prob-
ability treatments is shortened.
4.3 Password Generation Tips
Third, we measure the number of times users click
on the “Tips towards strong password” link and view
password generation tips. If the context-based password
strength meters can draw attentions and promote under-
standing among users as theorized, this would be an ex-
cellent opportunity to improve their awareness regarding
the issue of weak passwords.
The results are displayed in Table 4. Surprisingly, it
appears that users in the control group click the pass-
word generation tips more often than users in all of our
treatment groups. This finding is particularly interest-
ing since it suggests that incorporating additional in-
formation that can promote information security aware-
ness can be effective even for the traditional password
strength meter. As for the hypothesis testing, the average
numbers of occasions where users click “Tips towards
strong password” under three types of contextual in-
formation we provided are all significantly greater than
zero (t = 4.0963, p < 0.0001; t = 4.5506, p < 0.0001;
and t = 4.1231, p < 0.0001 for Time, Rank, and Prob-
ability respectively). Therefore, our Hypothesis 3a is
statistically supported. Meanwhile, our Hypothesis 3b
is not supported as the ANOVA analysis yields F =
0.6790, p= 0.5652. In other words, incorporating pass-
word generation tips into context-based password gen-
eration meters is significantly effective. However, the
effectiveness is at the same level as incorporating these
tips in the traditional password strength meter as the
difference in effectiveness between them is statistically
insignificant. Also, none of the difference between
three experimental treatments is statistically significant
as well.
Table 4: The average number of occasions users
click “Tips towards strong password” under
different scenarios and contextual warning
messages
Time Rank Probability Control Total
Bank 0.0976 0.1455 0.1489 0.1951 0.1467
Restaurant 0.1373 0.1389 0.1163 0.1944 0.1446
Forum 0.0976 0.1250 0.1000 0.1282 0.1133
Total 0.1128 0.1374 0.1250 0.1724 0.1360
5. Discussions and Conclusions
Nudging users to create stronger passwords is one
important goal of information security managers and re-
searchers. Our study shows that providing additional
contextual information along with warning messages
displayed by password strength meters could enhance
understanding among users, resulting in improved pass-
word generating behaviors. We draw theories from psy-
chology, human-computer interaction, and warning sci-
ences to identify potential weaknesses in the traditional
password strength meter. Following that, we conduct
a human subject study on Amazon Mechanical Turk to
test our hypotheses that adding contextual information
could enhance the effectiveness of password strength
meters. We find that the contextual information induces
users to pick stronger passwords. In addition, users
change their password more often. Furthermore, we also
find that adding a link that leads to password security
awareness training is significantly effective even in the
traditional password strength meter setting.
Our findings have implications for the use of contex-
tual information and password strength meters to pro-
mote secure behaviors among end users and make sig-
nificant contributions to the literature in behavioral in-
formation security. As most of previous works that study
password strength meters focus on understanding how
the underlying algorithm and appearance of password
strength meters affect user behavior, our work is among
the first to show that given the same algorithm and ap-
pearance, the effectiveness of the password strength me-
ter can be significantly improved by tweaking the warn-
594
ing message. Particularly, we show that adding contex-
tual information could help improving users’ password
generating behaviors. More importantly, we measure the
effectiveness of password strength meters by both the
increase in password strength, and the increase in num-
ber of occasions users change their password after see-
ing the password meter, which are usually overlooked
in prior studies. In addition, we find that different types
of contextual information can affect the effectiveness of
password strength meters differently. In our study, al-
though our three types of contextual information posi-
tively impact the effectiveness of password strength me-
ters, only the benefits from password rank is statistically
significant. This finding is a potential future research av-
enue to find the optimal contextual information that can
nudge users’ password generating behavior. Theories in
psychology, human-computer interaction, and usable se-
curity, among others, could be used to draw a conceptual
framework to develop the optimal contextual informa-
tion. Furthermore, we find that adding a link that leads
to password security awareness training is effective even
for the traditional password strength meter. This finding
is crucial as creating security awareness is one of the
most important parts in every security programs. Nev-
ertheless, it is important to note that one possible reason
that the traditional password strength meter leads more
users to click the link is because they want to know more
about the reason of the assessment. Lastly, our results
are also relevant to practitioners. For one, adding con-
textual information to password strength meters is rela-
tively simple. In our study, the traditional password me-
ter calculates the probability using the Backoff Markhov
Model. We derive three types of contextual information
out of that probability by estimating the time to crack,
the rank of the password, and the number of accounts
that share the same password, which could be done with-
out significant computation resources. Making these
minor changes to the existing password strength meter
could potentially lead to stronger passwords in general.
Our research is not without limitations. First, partic-
ipants in Amazon MTurk are known to be tech-savvy,
which might bias our study. As we show earlier, pass-
words in this study are significantly stronger than pass-
words in other datasets, which might indicate that our
observations are bias. Therefore, replicating our exper-
iment in a stricter control setting (e.g., laboratory with
student samples), or a more realistic setting (e.g., field
experiments) to validate our findings could be a great av-
enue for future research. Second, although we find that
“Tips towards strong password” is significantly effective
in terms of quantity (number of visits), we do not focus
on the quality part. For instance, what happened after
users click that link? Do they really read the provided
information? Can they remember the information and
apply it later? Future research which employs additional
post-test surveys to gauge participants’ understanding
before and after the study, or research that leverages a
laboratory equipped with eyes-tracking devices could be
conducted to improve our understandings.
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